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The darkside of Mao
My initial impression of this book was it was just another book on a forgotten Chinese leader. It was not long before I was absorbed in the 56 chapters of this book. Using newly declassified Soviet source I became more aware what really was behind early Nationalist government and its dependence on Lenin's aid for controlling China. Chiang Kai-Shek (abbre. CKS thereafter) along with revolutionaries at the time who were invited by Lenin to master communism techniques. Those who favored a social class struggle and effectively applied a brutal social reform became communists; those who favored a gradual transformation became nationalists.
Inspite of numerous Chinese, and non-Chinese language references cited, the authors did not carefully research and sometimes drew premature conclusions based on their grasp of the content. Some of the examples include but not limited here.
During the Northern Campaign to unify China, Sun Yet-Sen probably had his own agenda than Moscow's envoys. Officially his motto was "United with Soviets and Communists support the labor and farmers". The alliance became problematic quickly after the alliance as book suggests. Sun died and CKS who rose to replace Sun still had to rely Lenin for support. CKS's 1923 tour of Soviet Union showed disappointment (pp 19-25 in Reference 1 and pp 44-45 not substantiated in the book). It failed to mention that anti-imperialism was high on CKS agenda. Rather, the book merely suggested "CKS was being liquidated by Borodin with secret order" from Lenin. However, it was not confirmed in any documents. The split (i.e., purge of the communists) initiated by CKS was more an expression of disappointment of Nationalist faction over the socialists after the Second Congress in 1926 (pp 43). It was not a decision made by CKS. Confidential documents seized by Peking government showed Chinese communists were linked to Soviet subversion. Furthermore, bad news from Changsha violence instigated by Mao affected Nationalist army officers and soldiers alike. The order to purify communists in Shanghai was a matter of time to gain stronghold by KMT by riding trouble makers (pp 45).
The book states Mao was on Nationalist payroll to be a member of a standing committee around 1922. In those days the difference between Nationalist and Communists is the ideology employed. Sun's Huang-Po Military Academy started with 500 rifles donated by Lenin. Socialism and capitalism were openly debated by cadets, instructors and civilians. It was perfectly acceptable to switch from communism to nationalism or vice versa. It is somewhat similar to a Republican in America switches to become a Democrat. Even as late as 1949 the defected generals allowed their subordinates to choose side going to Peking or Taiwan (pp 308-9).
The explanation about Chiang made a deal with Mao let the Reds go in exchange of his son's release makes a nice story (pp137). However, it is not substantiated with any credible citations. The situation is much more complex as the truth really lies in the diary of CKS and his son CCK at Hoover's Institute's vault. A lot of long march occurred in the uncharted territory of the Celestica Kingdom. My 2001 trip to NE Sichuan-Gansu following the footsteps of terrain and long march suggested it was and is exceedingly difficult today to pursue people in these steep hills. It would take millions soldiers to encircle and trap the red army. It was a lot easier for the regional nationalists chase reds out of their turf giving them to other regional commanders.
The description of Dadu bridge crossing (pp153-155) is an interesting one as it would certainly rewrite the modern history of PRC and ruins its credibility. Edgar Snow wrote a different version story dramatize the event. Every Chinese citizen today was taught early about the courageous walk across the planks on the bridge under "heavy enemy gun fire". If nationalist soldiers defending the same bridge by Li were actually 50 kilometers away and soldiers defended the bridge not there, this would have devastating impact on the credibility of modern PRC government. This is substantiated as Mao had often said to Zhou En-Lai:" We write modern history anyway we feel as fits".
Another example of premature conclusion was labeling KMT general Hu Tsung-Nan a communist sleeper (pp 301). During the 1947 retake of Yenan, it was not "Hu K'ung-Mien, a representative of Hu, who passed on secrets to Mao" (pp 301). Rather, Hu's personal secretary Xiong Shiong Zhuan, recruited from Tsinghua University passed the information to Yenan. Mao was so confident about the source he did not allocate military resource to resist Hu. 90% of the Red Army was sent Manchuria instead (pg 302). Hu did not suspect Xiong. Mao stayed behind playing hide and seeks with pursuers (pp 304). The same argument went for General Wei Lihuang whose strategy in Manchuria caused the demise of the Nationalist military and support from the US (pp 306-8), as well as chief architect of Huai-Hai campaign involving some spies generals who deliberately messed up the battle plans causing the collapse of half a million nationalist soldiers equipped with American weapons (pp309).
The downfall of the Nationalists and lack of support from the mass was described vividly. Chiang's reliance of his relatives, using less capable civil servants caused so much discontent. It was rumored his appointees were there for themselves. Perhaps because of Chiang's inconsistent policy he was the cause of fall of his own government.
As Mao's indoctrination advocate and promise to the majority (97% of Chinese were peasants) to stand up fight against the mandarin system installed for centuries. The Communists promise appears to win an upper hand than the 3% landlord or gentry's class who support the nationalists. With so much defection going on, Chiang began to have less and less confidence in his officials. He had to rely on his own Huang Pu cadets who were labeled criminals of revolution. At battle field he often sent two officers to spy on another to ascertain one would not betray him thus making the task tedious and ineffective.
The argument from Taiwan has been that "Communist moles" were planted everywhere. What happened to the Nationalists moles on the Communist side? After their agents were sent to infiltrate the liberated areas they realized many Communist teachings actually were for the people. In this case they just gave in. The total destruction of CCP's tight public security system on people's privacy meant there was little or no way can an individual (mole) contact ROC even if he wanted to. Children were told at school to spy on their parents. All individuals require ID at neighborhood association and police knows everyone and watch strangers like hawks today. Any stranger temporally taking up residence is required to submit registration and is under constant surveillance.
After Mao liberated Chiang's capital Nanjing (pp 320-1) Chiang and people's party (KMT) essentially lost the support of the mass. Unlike the Japanese or Russians KMT did not carry out a "scorch earth policy" when they left mainland (pp321). They did manage to take them treasured imperial museum collection and some light items of military or economical use to Taiwan. Chiang left China with little damage. KMT left 68 ordinance and ship yards alone. It did much little destruction compared to the Soviets or Japanese. Chiang, while autocratic but believing in democracy and being a Methodist himself is not like Mao. The book pointed out, this was why Chiang was defeated by the authoritarian Mao (pp321).
The authors also went into great details about waves of purge campaigns after taking over mainland China (chapters 34-47). From waging a wasteful Korean War with loss of 400,000 lives (pp 378), persecution of the intellectuals, anti-anything not in line with his philosophy, Mao's best weapon was use one group fight against other rivals so as to intimidate the mass. His organizational skills surpass any state leaders. He now has total control on China.
Since the time of its first ruthless emperor, Qin Shihuang, known for building the Great Wall, China had been under centralized authoritarian rule. But when the Republic was formed in 1912, hopes were high for democratic political change. However, external and internal wars, self-serving warlords, and abysmal nationalist leaders tragically retarded China's political modularization. In 1949, a peasant rebellion influenced by a communist ideology led by Mao supported by Stalin created the PRC and drove the Nationalists to Taiwan. Mao Zedong, the self-proclaimed new emperor, perpetuated and intensified mainland China's despotic political tradition. Today's China is once again on the verge of merging with capitalism. Yet democratic reform in the PRC is still far from a certainty, much less a success. Fortunately, there are reasons to be optimistic. For one thing, Taiwan is prospering. Over the past decades, the Taiwanese have proudly proven that Western ideas of capitalism, freedom, and the rule of law can thrive together with Chinese culture. It may be this type of reform which will work in modern China. That may take some time for the central government to accept.
How Mao's well intentional programs failed miserably in the 1950-70 can be found in chapter 40 (pp 426 and on). Without any new technology people were pressed to carry out wasteful projects and most had to be abandoned. In 1957, Mao envisioned a scheme to beat Great Britain's steel production with another campaign. The rice fields were littered with home made dirt blast furnaces to produce steel (pp 431). Trees were cut to feed into those monstrous furnaces. People threw in their kitchen skillets to meet the useless iron production quota had no kitchenware to use. It was the kids, peasants who tried to please Mao who continued on with the non-sense talk" bourgeois professors' knowledge should be treated as dogs' fart, worth nothing"(pp 434). His edict to consolidate families into a commune work unit became so unpopular and brutal it had to be abandoned.
Mao's campaign to elimination seed eating birds turned China into a disastrous locust and insect invasion on farms from the eco-imbalance effort 38,000,000 people starved to death (pp 439, numbers are higher than reported from other sources). The death numbers never seem to bother Mao. He went in so far as telling Moscow in 1957 that China was ready to sacrifice 300 million for the sake of revolution. "The Tibetans did not even own rice bowls any more. Under CKS and the warlord Ma Pu-Fang rule they had at least bowls(pp 456)". During 1989 Beijing democratic reform demonstration, one of the leading military figure urged Deng Xiao Ping to slaughter 100,000 students in order to maintain stability.
Today's China does not even remotely resemble Mao's idea! It was Liu Shao Chi and Deng Xiao Ping who transform from a backward isolate socialist state to a capitalist China. Is this the government people really want today?
This is an excellent book to get an understanding of Mao. A barely literate peasant-like person led the most populous country for so long. A lot of Mao's mistakes and ruthless policy were reverberated throughout the text. It suggests that Chiang had a vision and was right in many actions taken. KMT did not have an opportunity to prove its rightness before it was completely destroyed. The downside of the book was there were not enough credible in depth research. The photos included were not original. Readers need to do more research to confirm findings.
The authors have un-raveled the myth and holiness of Mao. This book will never be allowed to show up on book shelves inside China. In recent years a book written about Mao by his private physician has been smuggled into China. People just learned about his peasant-like life style but he is still king and god of China. Even a review of this book one will skillfully be filtered out on the Chinese Internet. The only thing I found was reviews I have done on Ba Jing's book. I sincerely hope that it ultimately gets slips into China so people there can discover, or perhaps have their suspicions confirmed, how the Chinese government has distorted its own founder and history skillfully for so long.
Sam Shueh, digital librarian
Reference
1.Chiang KS, Soviet Russia in China, Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, New York, NY.
January 2007 · Books