Bests & Worsts Reviews from Amazon

Errors in fact and in conjecture are found in almost every paragraph of this myopic look at the CIA’s paramilitary in Laos. - The opening scene of CIA’s Bill Lair and Hmong warlord Vang Pao meeting to discuss terms of US cooperation with the Hmong to counter communism in Laos, addressed one of the key post-war questions of what was promised to the Hmong. And what wasn’t. Anyone with experience in the CIA’s clandestine service knows that clearly detailed written commitments when cooperation is initiated with any foreign body is a bed-rock, essential part of the business. The author of this book’s collection of nonsense sides with Vang Pao’s memory. I side with Bill Lair’s official acc’t, an opinion he discussed with the author. It is inconceivable that Bill would have made a commitment of that magnitude and have no recollection. This wrong call, to my mind, on page three of this 323 tome, is a harbinger for the ensuing page-after-page of sloppy, poorly constructed analysis. - I served as a CIA paramilitary officer in Laos from November 1971 to the fall of 1973 when I was one of the last four CIA case officers in Long Tieng. Books on my service include Codename Mule (published by the Naval Institute Press to significant acclaim) and The Battle for Skyline Ridge (Kindle version). It is impossible to reconcile my first hand acc’t with Kurlantzick’s book. For example his rending of the fight for Skyline is way off the mark. CIA case officer Eli Chavez - "with bandoliers of ammo laced across his chest" - did not lead 1200 “Hmong and Thai soldiers” up the ridgeline. He had a 800 man battalion of lowland Lao soldiers and no one I know had any knowledge that he, personally, was directly involved. On the other hand “Hog” and Mike Ingham two other CIA case officers who did play significant personal roles in the battle are only mentioned in passing. And per “RedCoat,” the CIA case officer up at LS 32, Bouam Long, who was there on the ground during the ‘71/’72 seize, Kulantzick’s coverage is inaccurate on most key aspects. His fantasy acc't of the battle for Bouam Long, besmirks the heroics of Cher Pao Moua and the Hmong under his command. - This is a small point, but illustrates my larger premise about this book… but Kulantzick’s assertion that Hog was married is astonishing news to everyone who knew him. - There is almost no mention in the book of the CIA paramilitary’s considerable work in other areas of Laos than Long Tieng. Nothing on the CIA base in MR-I’s work against the China road and Savannakhet and Pakse bases work against the Ho Chi Minh trail. No coverage of Air America or the Ravens, both significant players out of Long Tieng. - Anyone generally familiar with the CIA’s role in Laos knows that Ambassadors Sullivan, in Vientiane, and Harriman, in WDC, were obstructionists in the US efforts to win a military victory in SEA. This book’s mention of Sullivan, and by extension Harriman, ignores CIA Director Colby’s comments on the matter. - The extent of the factual errors in this book calls into question the rousing endorsements from the authors and others on this amazon.com page, on the “think tank” Kurlantzick works for and the Simon & Schuster publishing house… especially Simon & Schuster. If they are guilty of such lacks vetting in this book, one has to wonder about its other “non-fiction” products. This book is so flawed as to make the CIA's work in Laos that much more of a secret, because Kurlantzick's garbled facts and failed summations greatly obfuscate the real truths. Of this I am 100 percent sure. P.S. About a year ago Kurlantzick emailed me with a request to use some of the photos from my books in his upcoming look at the CIA in Laos. I suggested he might want to talk with me about some of the background to the photos and he said no that he had all the “background” that he needed, he just wanted my photos to illustrate his points. To put this in context, although more than three million Americans served in Indochina, I was one of only 18 CIA case officers in Long Tieng during the heaviest fighting against the invading North Vietnamese. Of this number only 7 are still alive to give a first hand acc’ting of CIA paramilitary activates. Kurlantzick did not interview any of us, though with me he certainly had the chance. Not ONE of the contrarians to US military/CIA efforts quoted above in support of this bad book has any sweat equity or credible insides into CIA/Laos. Pls consider those fawning reviews by professional cynics with that in mind. From someone who knows... this book is garbage.