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The author of this book, Herbert P. Bix, is an American who has long taught in Japan. I know him only by reputation, but his reputation doesn't inspire me to much confidence in his work. He is known as an adherent of the neo-Marxist historiography that continues to have a vogue in Japanese academic circles. To me, his book seems to show its stamp quite clearly. Here are a few quotes from reviews in respected journals (rather than the advertising-influenced popular press) by people with strong reputations as scholars of modern Japanese history: "Superbly written, meticulously researched, and vigorously advertised.... Other historians, examining more or less the same material, reached different conclusions. ... All the rescripts, edicts, and declarations of the emperor, which Bix quotes extensively and to which he attaches great importance, were composed by the cabinet or other government organs. All the appointments he `made' had been decided in advance by others and `humbly submitted' to him for approval. All the military orders he `issued' had been formulated by the armed forces and presented to him for signature. On some occasions his personal views were taken into consideration, but except for August 1945, he was never expected to make a major decision. ... The author accepts the evidence that fits his theory, but discards that which contradicts it. He believes Konoe that Hirohito endorsed the views of the military, but does not believe him that the emperor wished to avoid war (pp. 419-20). He believes Hirohito's admission, in the Monologue, that one of his motives for ending the war was to preserve the dynasty, but does not believe hint that his main motive was to save the people (p. 515 ) . When evidence is lacking, innuendo is used." -- Ben-Ami Shillony, _Journal of Japanese Studies_, 28,1 (Winter 2002): 141-146. "Herbert Bix's book is a welcome contribution whether or not one agrees with his interpretations. ... Nor does he cite authors ... whose interpretations, based on documentary evidence that Bix ignores, differ from his own. ... Bix exaggerates Hirohito's importance. His own narrative account is at odds with his emphasis on Hirohito as the key decision maker because it shows the great extent to which the emperor was constrained by the bureaucratic monarchy within which he operated." -- Stephen S. Large, _Monumenta Nipponica_, 56, 1 (Spring 2001): 107-110. "Bix is amply justified in accentuating Hirohito's active enthusiasm and engagement as supreme commander and in identifying his continued belligerence as a significant source of pressure on Japanese generals and admirals. But Bix clearly overstates the degree to which the emperor was able to initiate or precipitate changes in national policy.... His ambitious claims ... depend upon a very liberal reading of evidence that comes almost entirely from second-hand accounts.... The degree to which Bix recklessly outpaces his sources can perhaps best be summed up by the juxtaposition of a candid admission with a bold declaration. Without further elaboration, he proclaims, `Though no documents directly tie him to it, another feature of the brutal China war for which Hirohito should be charged with personal responsibility was the strategic bombing of Chungking and other cities.' ... Bix's daring in argument is also, unfortunately, reflected in the mechanics of this book. Mistransliterations abound here, and footnotes supporting controversial statements of fact or interpretation often point simply to other secondary sources." -- Frederick R. Dickinson, _Orbis_, 45, 4 (Fall 2001): 637-647. (Some will criticize me, in turn, for not citing the much more favorable reviews of Marxist historians; I will leave that to others.) These are only very brief snippets from much longer and deeper reviews, but as they suggest the general picture is of a book that has definite merits but which must be read carefully and knowledgably. If you are already quite familiar with Japan's history in the Taisho and Showa periods (so that you can tell where Bix omits or distorts important facts that are inconvenient for his argument) and want a fuller picture of Hirohito (and particularly of his early life) then the book will prove valuable. But if you are looking for a good introduction to the period and its issues, or to the emperor himself, look further. The role of Hirohito in Japan's history as its Showa Emperor was a largely inglorious one, especially up to August of 1945. But to put the blame for Japan's ruinous course to and through World War II so squarely on his slight shoulders, as Bix does, not only distorts history but serves as a smokescreen to conceal its lessons for today. We have buried Hirohito, but the forces that propelled Japan into an awful and catastrophic war continue to stalk our world today. If we are deceived by the casuistry of Herbert Bix and his ilk, they will roam free to spawn new generations of demons. Will O'Neil