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Although I agree with the author's statement that, "unless and until we understand William Childs Westmoreland, we will never fully understand what happened to us in Vietnam, or why," I don't believe the author achieved this goal. There are several reasons why I believe this book does not live up to its own expectations. My first issue is Lewis Sorley's over-reliance on memoirs and oral histories in an effort to prove his points. The problem with this approach is you wind up with a "he-said-she-said" argument based on the opinions of those involved. Without context, whether these individuals supported Westmoreland or not, this comes across as a group of men finding fault after the fact. Which leads to my second issue: lack of context and analysis. The book is a basic narrative that merely follows Westmoreland's life as if placed on a timeline. In fact, at times it comes across as a string of anecdotes, many of which seem out of place within the author's narrative. Without context or analysis you realize you're just reading data. In fact, the first part of the book, which focuses on Westmoreland's pre-Vietnam life, could almost be dropped in its entirety. The author does not provide any insight into how his subject's life before Vietnam influenced or created the man who commanded MACV. For example, Sorley seems to make a big deal of Westmoreland's experience in Korea, but after reading through several implied "key" events, again without context, the author doesn't pull the threads together to let the reader know what impact this may, or apparently may not, have had on Westmoreland in Vietnam. The lack of context is particularly notable because the author does not address the context of US strategy within which Westmoreland had to operate; nor does he examine the strategic situation in Southeast Asia; nor does he address the North's strategy. In other words, the book presents Westmoreland's strategy in a single dimension that does not examine the strategic factors within which he had to operate. For example, Sorley takes issue with Westmoreland's use of US forces to attack and break up enemy battalions and regiments; however an argument can be made that without destroying these elements local pacification would have been impossible (see "Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Viet Cong's Big-Unit War Against the U.S., 1965-1966"). It's also possible that depending on what point in time the war was being fought, and where, differing strategies were required. But none of this is addressed in presenting Westmoreland's decisions. My third issue with the book is that, any book claiming that the Westmoreland lost the war would have to compare what he did to what he was supposed to accomplish. At no point does the author address what Westmoreland was supposed to accomplish. He makes the point that as the commander he is responsible for what his command does or fails to do, as any military commander is, but this is the easy way out. There are also many, many other reasons why the US lost. In order to place the blame on Westmoreland, you would have to address the other issues and how they compared to what Westmoreland did, or failed to do. There were systemic issues and constraints that also caused the US to lose the war; what were they and how did they impact, or not, Westmoreland's decisions? Unfortunately, Sorley's book presents nothing new about the war or about Westmoreland. It comes across as merely an attempt to blame Westmoreland for American's failure in Vietnam without, at any time, putting the war or Westmoreland's decisions in context. But, as has been addressed in dozens of other books, the war's loss was due to a number of other variables. In fact, before reading this book I'd recommend that you read, "On Strategy" by Harry Summers, "Dereliction of Duty" by H. R. McMaster, and "Why the North Won the Vietnam War" edited by Marc Jason Gilbert - particularly the chapter by Jeffrey Record, "How America's Own Military Performance in Vietnam Aided and Abetted the "North's" Victory," to name a few. I'm not saying that Westmoreland was not responsible for his actions. My argument is that Sorley relies upon the opinions of others to paint a negative picture of Westmoreland, rather than providing strategic or political context, or by providing an analysis of events or decisions using more concrete sources. For example, Westmoreland's decisions to limit individual tours to one year, rely upon a war of attrition, or his failure to properly arm and train the South Vietnamese military are all presented as "wrong" decisions because others say so. But without context you can't understand the "why" he made those decisions, and without addressing what other options he had you're left merely with the argument that Westmoreland was wrong just because of popular opinion.