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This book examines World War II from late 1942 through late 1943. Although Citino initially states that he intended to examine the 1943 campaigns, the book really ends in about September 1943. His detailed analysis of the Italian campaign ends with Salerno, and detailed analysis of the Eastern Front ends with the Soviet seizure of bridgeheads over the Dnepr. Moreover, he barely describes the actions on the northern wing of the Eastern Front at all, and his discussion of Army Group Center basically ends with Operation Kutuzov in August. Within these limitations, the operational narrative is well written, and one cannot take exception to his description of the events themselves. Unfortunately, the excessive academic theorizing, faulty analysis, and absurd conclusion completely ruin this book. Citino attempts to show how German decisions in 1943 reflected the longstanding traditions of German military history and culture, or what he calls the "German way in warfare." The focus on "military culture" is a preoccupation of academic historians like Citino, who hold "mere" operational history in low esteem. According to Citino, German military culture demanded that wars be short, with high mobility and aggression to overcome adversaries with superior resources. The problem with this is that there is nothing uniquely German about the need to fight short wars. EVERY country seeks to do this, for the obvious reason that no country benefits from a long war. Sun Tzu said, "In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns" - so the ancient Chinese believed in short offensive wars, this was not something Prussia recently invented. One could easily write a book on the "French Way of War" and the "Russian Way of War" showing that these countries, historically, tried to fight short wars against isolated opponents, just like Prussia and Germany did, and valued mobile offensive operations, just like Prussia and Germany did. There is nothing especially "German" about mobility - every army regarded this as desirable, which is why every army had cavalry and later mechanized forces. Every army detested the static warfare of World War I, and sought to restore mobility to the battlefield during the interwar period. The mere fact that Germany had a specific word for mobile warfare (Bewegungskrieg) does not establish that there was something "culturally German" about it - or at any rate, this book does not establish that there is. Citino's argument about German military culture is excessively broad and simplistic. Exactly how much "culture" did the Wehrmacht share with Frederick the Great's Prussians and the elder Moltke's Germans? The author provides little analysis of this. He only makes the crude assertion that they all "culturally" desired short offensive wars. Did Frederick the Great's troops really have the same beliefs, motivations, perceptions, and values as the Nazis? If what motivated the Wehrmacht was very different from what motivated its predecessors, then Citino's argument about a persistent German "military culture" falls apart. Another example of Citino's vapid academic theorizing is his attack on "personalism" (i.e., the role of the individual) in military history and on the idea of "military genius." He contends that more sophisticated academic social and economic historians concentrate on the "great impersonal forces" that move history; meanwhile, the "conservative" dinosaurs in military history still obsess over generals and their mistakes. However, unlike many social and economic organizations, the military IS organized around individuals - specifically, the commanders. The fundamental purpose of any military organization is to transmit and carry out the commander's orders. Therefore, in military history, it is entirely necessary and proper - even vital - to study commanders and their decisions! One can cite countless examples of men whose leadership and decisions decisively influenced the outcome of battles, campaigns, and even wars. Three of the seven main chapters in this book are named after two generals (Manstein and Kesselring), which rather undercuts the contention that generals have little or no influence on events. If they hardly matter, why spend so much time talking about them? Right after the author spends four pages scoffing at the idea of "military genius," he openly admits "Manstein certainly was a genius" - which makes one wonder why Citino even wrote the preceding pages. Then later, the author argues that the Donets-Kharkov campaign of early 1943 did not reflect Manstein's genius, but rather the "traditional thought of the German General Staff." From this one must conclude that Citino believes that ANY German general trained in that "traditional thought" could have done what Manstein did in early 1943. This is nonsense. Not all German generals were the same, for all that they emerged from the same military culture. Some German generals, like Manstein, were clearly much better than others - in short, geniuses. This fact totally negates the author's claim that the importance of this particular commander at this particular time is overstated. Later in the book, Citino blames Fredendall for Kasserine, and notes that there wasn't much wrong with the American II Corps that the leadership of Patton and Bradley couldn't fix. But wait, weren't Bradley and Patton products of the same "military culture" as Fredendall? If the same military culture can produce bad generals as well as great generals, then what, exactly, does "military culture" explain that is useful? Certainly "military culture" does not explain the course and outcome of military operations. The qualities of the individual commander, and the decisions he makes, are paramount - in short, "personalism" is unavoidable! In his analysis of events, Citino contends that the fight for the Ukraine "should have been Manstein's war" - i.e., exactly the type of mobile war Manstein wanted - and yet the result was defeat and disaster for Germany. But the fight for the Ukraine after Kursk was NOT what Manstein wanted, because (hello!) this fight happened AFTER Operation Citadel had worn down Germany's mobile forces. Manstein wanted to let the Soviets attack first and hit them "on the backhand"; attacking the Soviets first was NOT the sort of war he wanted to fight. Citino's offhand claim in this chapter that the Red Army in 1941 was a "highly skilled and brilliantly led force" is frankly bizarre. David Glantz entitled his book about the 1941 Red Army "Stumbling Colossus" for a good reason. That the Soviets were skilled and well-led in 1943 does not establish that they were skilled and well-led in 1941. With respect to Italy, Citino argues that Kesselring was not a "master of defensive warfare" because the Germans were defeated in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy. In Citino's view, "the German defense of Italy was an utter failure." This is preposterous. One has only to compare what the Allies intended to do to what they actually did in order to understand Kesselring's achievement. The Allies thought they were going to be in Tunis in November 1942, but Kesselring stopped them until May 1943. The Allies thought they were going to reach northern Italy soon after they landed at Salerno; but Kesselring stopped them. The Allies thought they were going to destroy the German army and exploit into northern Italy after they landed at Anzio; but Kesselring stopped them. In June 1944, the Allies again thought they were going to destroy the German army and exploit into northern Italy; but Kesselring stopped them. The Allies did not get to northern Italy until April 1945, eighteen months after they planned to do so. This is hardly an "utter failure" for the Germans. But the author is determined to de-mythicize the Germans and dethrone the concept of "military genius," and therefore he can give Kesselring and Manstein no credit for anything. The conclusion of the book is totally jejune. Citino contends that the Wehrmacht does not deserve respect for fighting on after 1943, and the German officer corps had no business fighting an obviously lost war. Can there be any more convincing demonstration that Citino, a supposed expert in German military culture, does NOT understand German military culture in 1943 than these fatuous contentions? I vehemently disagree with the author's opinion that the Germans were not bravely defending their homeland in 1943. Allied aircraft were already killing German women and children en masse, and Allied armies would do worse once they got to Germany. Every German soldier who fought to prevent that in 1943 was, in fact, defending his homeland. And let's not forget, the Allies did not give the Germans a reason to surrender! Indeed, the Allies couldn't have done a better job of convincing the Germans to fight harder. In making these absurd claims, Citino is merely projecting the values, beliefs, and culture of 2012 America back onto 1943 Germany. The Germans in 1943 did not share the 2012 American belief that Nazi Germany was unredeemably evil and unworthy of defense, and therefore Citino's statements to this effect are an irrelevant display of moral preening. On the whole, the author would have been much better off if he'd left out the academic twaddle and the personal opinions, and simply stuck to an operational narrative. Unfortunately, even his analysis of military operations is not well done in this book.