Bests & Worsts Reviews from Amazon

As an avid reader of philosophy, and an avid reader of science, I fully expected to enjoy this book or at least find it thought provoking. After having read it, I can only say that I spent most of the time wondering whether Harris's position would ever really be argued for or why he consistently chose such easy moral cases to deal with. In other words, the bulk of this book consists of Harris making assumptions that should be argued for and "arguing" for them by using cases that a B.A. in Philosophy should have known to stay away from. Harris's main point is that science will aid tremendously in determining the right and wrong answers to moral questions. How? By using ever-advancing knowledge of brain states to figure out how to maximize human well-being. Assumption 1: utilitarianism is the obvious default moral position. Assumption 2: a word like "well-being" (which Harris knows is broad, as evidenced by his frequent apology for using it) is not so vague as to have a huge plurality of possible...subjective...interpretations. Assumption 1 is that which will likely make the philosophically inclined cringe. Utilitarianism has seen its share of controversy and, I am sorry to say, Harris's discussion of the problematics is far too shallow. (The objections he anticipates and his refutations of them are suitable for an entry-level philosophy book.) In fact, utilitarianism is itself a moral assumption that begs questions such as: can an equation for interpersonal utility comparisons be anything but arbitrary? is it actually moral to adapt an impartial view that concerns itself with maximizing aggregate well-being when doing so may cause me not to prefer those close to me to strangers? are we talking about act-utilitarianism (where acts that maximize aggregate well-being are what count) or rule-utilitarianism (where RULES that justify aggregate well-being are what count)? what kind of time frame is acceptable between the act in question and the consequence that will maximize human well-being? I bring these up to raise two concerns. First, these objections are not original and have been around for some time, yet Harris doesn't seem to know or care that they exist. Second, nothing he writes in this book can even hint at how to answer any of these questions, rendering his assumption of utilitarianism just that: an assumption that begs too many questions to be a good assumption. Harris is motivated particularly by David Hume's is/ought distinction that essentially argues that facts cannot lead directly to values by pure reasoning alone. Harris says he is trying to get around this but I don't see how he does. All Harris tells us is that science will one day make it possible to know exactly how to maximize human well-being (again, a very loose word with a multiplicity of possible interpretations). But what Hume's point was is that even with these facts, something other than reason must get us from them to any moral position. Suppose, for instance, that we are dealing with three people, and we know that two of them could experience great pleasure at the displeasure of the third. There are facts of the matter here, but whether we decide to sacrifice the one to maximize the others' pleasure, refuse to do so, or leave them all to themselves is not a question that is OR CAN BE purely based on the facts, as evidenced by the fact that all three of those positions equally take account of the facts but use them in different ways. Lastly, there is Harris's persistent use of easy cases to try to make his point. Do objective right and wrong answers exist on moral decisions? Yes. How do we know? Well, says Harris, isn't it obvious that there is a right answer to the question about whether genital mutilation is better than no genital mutilation? Isn't is clear to say that crashing planes into buildings in order to kill those who don't worship as you do doesn't lead to human flourishing? Well, the problem is that these are extremely easy cases! Almost all moral theories (except ones easy to dispense with, like religious appeals or appeals to authority) would agree, albeit for different reasons, that these are wrong. But what about cases like whether it is moral to kill who you think is a terrorist because you are pretty sure doing so will avert an attack that will kill 20? Is it moral to allow one person to get extreme enjoyment out of having sex with people who are in a vegetative state? (By Harris's account, this example WOULD maximize human flourishing by increasing aggregate happiness.) Or, again, is it moral to make interpersonal value judgments that effectively force some to give to others because a formula tells you that the former's liberty is less valuable than the latter's happiness? Harris would have done a great service to his arguments had he dealt with ANY cases that were morally difficult. That he did not may tell us either how much thought has gone into his arguments or how confident he is in them. Or both. I have liked Sam Harris's previous books. I did not like this one. I simply feel like he is out of his league on this topic. His subtitle sets up a question that he just doesn't deliver on. Maybe someone else can.